The South European Welfare States: Problems and Identity
I- The South European Welfare States, in search of an identity
The argument for a “ Southern European Welfare State”
A critical approach of Ferrera’s "South-European model"
II- General characteristics of the Social Protection Systems in Southern Europe
The South-European “variant” as a sub-category of the State-corporatist
model
Basic patterns of the Welfare State in Southern Europe
III- Recent developments
Migration
Employement
In recent
years there has been a number of publications, which try to depict the
peculiarities of the southern European welfare states. This article summarizes
the related basic positions of a recent monograph of the authors, to be
published in 2002 by Palgrave. In the confines of the limited space of this
essay, we shall first look at the problem of the specificity of a “South
European” deviation from the classical typologies. Within this framework, after
having examined and criticized the principal theoretical models (Section I), we shall proceed to the
drawing of an outline of the principal characteristics of the welfare
structures of the Southern European states (Section
II) and the recent evolution in the area of migration and employment (Section III). We will argue that these
welfare systems share all the basic institutional characteristics of the
“state-corporatist” welfare model. However, the delayed founding and overall
underdevelopment of the welfare state in the area, together with a number of
similarities in social structures and economy, clearly place the Southern
European countries in a distinctive sub-category of the model. Still, all
Southerners are not the same. Two clusters are discernible, one made up of the
Iberian countries and the other Italy and Greece. Different historical
traditions and, especially, the dissimilar weight of patronage and clientelism
are the main factors of this differentiation.
I- The South European Welfare States, in search of an identity
The
argument for a “ Southern European Welfare State”
It is not until recently (mid-1990s) that
the academic debate started dealing in more detail with the study of the ‘South
European Welfare state’. A number of authors have suggested the existence of a
distinct latin-rim (Leibfried, 1993) or semi-peripheral welfare state (Santos,
1994; Hespanha, 1999, Marinakou, 1998), comprising Greece, Italy, Portugal and
Spain. However the more influential
argument about a Southern European Welfare State has been proposed by M. Ferrera (Ferrera, 1996, 1997, 1999). He and others
following his argumentation (Rhodes, 1997, Matsaganis-Guillen 2001***), define
the basic characteristics of the model as follows.
1- A highly fragmented and “corporatist” income maintenance system, displaying an internal polarization and peaks of generosity (especially regarding pensions) for privileged strata of the population (for example public functionaries) coexist with gaps in protection.
2- A low degree of state penetration of the welfare sphere and a highly collusive mix between public and non public actors and institutions.
3- The strong influence of the Catholic Church.
4- The persistence of clientelism and the
formation of elaborated “patronage machines” for the selective distribution of
cash subsidies.
5- A differentiation from the corporatist traditions in the field of health care and the establishment of National Health Services based on universalistic principles.
6- The lack of an efficient, rational, Weberian type administration, the “uncivicness” of political culture and the weakness of civil society which result in the bureaucratization and the legislative over regulation of the system (Niero, 1996, p. 118; Ferrera, 1997, p. 149; Ferrera, 1997, p. 235).
7- The prominence of parties as the main
aggregators of social interests and the existence of a radical left, not
allowing the formation of consensual policies.
Most of those points do reflect the situation
in the European South, especially in Italy and Greece. Despite this fact and
although this model generally avoids the oversimplifications of other similar
propositions, there are several points that need to be raised. It is to these
that we now turn our attention.
A
critical approach of Ferrera’s South-European model
1- There is an inherent methodological
inconsistency in the argument, with regard to the Esping-Andersen typology,
into which it is implicitly presupposed. It should be clear that if one accepts
the typology of the “three worlds of welfare capitalism” as a system of reference,
one should use its criteria in order to add a fourth one. And this is because
every classification is a descriptive system that attempts a generalization of
common features, using some predefined
criteria, in order to be used as a heuristic tool for drawing a topology of
common features and further identifying problems and trends.
However,
the addition of a “Latin-Rim” model is not based on Esping-Andersen’s criteria,
but on a different framework of sociopolitical data. As we have seen, Ferrera
has introduced a new set of political and sociological parameters that
differentiate the Southern European countries inside the state-corporatist
model. Therefore his propositions do not actually imply the existence of a new
model, but merely suggest the existence of a sub-variation within the structural
matrix of the existing ones.
Consequently, the question is not whether
there are any particularities of the
South-European model in comparison with the continental state-corporatist
archetype (of course there are), but whether these particularities, by
reference to the above mentioned criteria and not exogenous others, could be
seen as constituting a distinct model.
To this purpose, a re-reading of Esping-Andersen is highly illustrative of the
characteristics of the Southern Welfare states. It is true that the author has
included only Italy in the set of his comparative data and in a less well known
essay has expressed doubts as to whether until recently Spain and Portugal had
genuine welfare States (Esping,-Andersen 1992). Still, it should be clear that
according to his classification, all four countries are typically
state-corporatist.
2. There are a number of substantial reservations concerning the fundamentals of the proposed model. To begin with, some of the proposed features (clearly among them: corporatist fragmentation; the public deficit in Welfare provision; and the influence of the Catholic Church) are shared by the other continental states. Some however, are not common to all four Southern countries, at least to the same extent (for example, the tradition of clientelism and patronage). Hence, not only Italy and Greece, but also France are characterized by a strong degree of occupational fragmentation as well as by a dualistic system of social protection. Portugal, on the other hand, offers a clear example of a relatively low degree of fragmentation (Ferrera, 1996, p. 19).
The same is true with regard to the treatment of the “selective generosity” of the pensions for the privileged strata of the population, usually the public functionaries. Naturally, by definition, the civil service pensions are occupational in nature. According to Esping-Andersen, the special treatment of civil servants “reflects the legacy of etatism and corporate privilege” throughout the whole conservative model (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 81) and the degree of “etatism” of a social protection system is measured by the expenditure on government employee pensions as a percentage of GDP (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 73).
3. The “iper garantismo”, at least in favor of the insiders in the labor market, is one of Ferrara’s central arguments in support the argument for the distinct character of the Southern European model. The evidence, however, does not confirm this. According to OECD figures (Kalisch and Aman, 1999), the replacement rate of income for Greece is estimated at 60 per cent for the basic pension and 20 per cent for the auxiliary pension of pensionable earnings, after 35 years of insurance. Currently, in total, 79.57 per cent of income is ensured, when calculated according to article 66 of the European Code of Social Security. In Italy, prior to the 1995 reform, the maximum replacement rate could be 80 per cent, with full benefits for a 40 year contribution. However, after the reform, the replacement rate is expected to be between 47 per cent and 60 per cent (Pizzuti, 1998, p. 46). Eurostat estimates indicate that the pension for a new Italian retiree with 20 years of contributions will be equal to 45 per cent of the average gross wage. According to other estimates, because of the elimination of the indexation of pensions, the ratio between pension and current earnings would decline from 47 per cent to about 30 per cent and be further reduced for every additional year after that (Pizzuti, 1998).
In Portugal, the retirement pension ranges from 30 percent (minimum) to 80 per cent (maximum) of average earnings. A non-contributory supplement is added when the calculated benefit is less than the minimum rate set by law. According to OECD data, on average, newly-retired workers in 1994 received benefits equal to 50.8 per cent of median wages (Roseveare et al, 1996, p. 61). In Spain, as a result of the reforms of the last decade, the ratio of the initial pension in the General Regime and the average net wage in industry and services fell from 65 per cent in 1984 to 53-6 per cent in the 1985-1990 period. (González-Páramo, 1998).
The real situation of the level of pensions, far from being generous, can be determined only with reference to the calculation of pension benefits in PPS. The official statistics of the European Union (Eurostat, 1994) distinguish three groups of countries based on the criterion of the «generosity» of their social protection systems, calculated on the basis of average benefits paid to retired persons. Italy and Luxembourg belong in the most generous group.. All the other Southern European countries, however, belong to the least generous group, together with Ireland. The Italian pensioner receives 135 per cent of the average benefit of the EU, and his/her Greek counterpart gets only half and the Portuguese a third of this amount.
4.
The influence of the Catholic Church cannot be a distinctive feature of the
model, not only because Greece is not a Catholic country and the Greek Orthodox
Church does not play a similar role in the field of social policy, but
principally as Catholicism marks also the core countries of the Continental
model.
5.
The establishment of national health systems with universalistic aspirations
has been proposed as a decisive factor of differentiation, resulting in “an
original mix of corporatism and universalism” (Ferrera, 1997, p. 29). The
assumption of universalism as a distinct characteristic of the model based on
this sole element, however, seems exaggerated. First of all it is a relatively
recent feature. It was not until the late 1970s that Italy adopted a
universalistic approach in this area and the other three Southern European
countries followed during the next decade. Moreover, universality still remains
a half institutionalized premise. For instance, the Portuguese National Health
Service covers approximately 75 per cent of the population, the remaining 25
per cent, especially those in the civil service and the military, participate
in special additional occupational schemes (Gouveia Pinto, 1997, p. 142). Even
in Spain, where coverage reaches 98.5 per cent of the population, of which 93
per cent are covered by the "compulsory" insurance scheme, 1 per cent
obtain means-tested subsidies from the state and 4.5 per cent of the
population, mostly civil servants, are insured through special schemes.
(Jakubowski, 1998).
The basic difference of a universalistic health system when compared to
an occupational one lies in the funding of the former by taxation and the
latter through the social insurance. Still, the Southern NHS are not completely
emancipated from social insurance, which, especially in Greece and Italy, funds
about 40 per cent of total expenses. Even in Portugal, where
the funding of the NHS by taxation has been established since 1976, some
services are still provided within the framework of social insurance. Regarding the financing of the system, there is a separation of the
Southern European member states into two discernible clusters, the first
comprising Greece and Italy and the latter the Iberian countries. In the first
group social insurance still plays a considerable role, funding about 40 per
cent of the total expenses of the system, whereas in the second group it represents
only 10-20 per cent of the total. (Kyriopoulos and Niakas, 1993; Economou,
1999).
6. Clientelism has been suggested as a permanent feature of the political system and the system of social protection. This factor is clearly predominant in Greece and in Italy but much less so in the Iberian countries, which have a different, more corporatist tradition. It seems that in Spain and Portugal clientelistic policies are embedded only in some geographical areas and special sectors (for example invalidity pensions). For this reason, in the words of Garcia (Garcia, 1999, p. 158), “clientelism should not be considered as a universal cultural characteristic of Southern Europe”.
On the contrary, in Greece and in Italy,
it has not been traditional corporatism but patronage that functioned as a
substitute for the Welfare State, establishing vertical, instrumental channels
of articulation of demands (Tsoukalas, 1986; Mouzelis, 1977; Filias, 1981;
Petmesidou, 1996; Fargion 1999). Epecially in Greece, the Catholic –or the fascist-
corporatism, which meant to integrate the individual into an organic entity, is
completely alien to the dominant social ideology, despite the efforts made by
the short-lived dictatorship of Metaxas (1936-1940). Therefore, each
professional group attempts to create special linkages and relationships to the
public power in an ad hoc and not “organic” manner and this process results in
an acute political incrementalism (Petmesidou, 1987; Ascoli, 1987). Within this
framework, special relations develop between the State and interest groups,
primarily within the public sector.
For this reason, the proliferation of insurance and pension funds in Greece and Italy should not be seen as a result of traditional corporatism but as a by-product and outcome of clientelistic networks of state patronage. There are cases where special insurance “privileges” have not been provided to a friendly clientele, but were the outcome of a long struggle of an “outsider” trade union (the case of the strong trade union of Greek construction workers is typical, traditionally under the hegemony of the Communist Party). In the latter case these “privileges” are nothing more than a form of deferred wages (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 81).
The proliferation of invalidity pensions in Italy is an example of these policies on an individual basis. Another example is offered by the fact that in Greece about 40 per cent of private sector workers were classified as working under “arduous and unhealthy employment conditions”, which implies the right to early retirement. On the contrary, the extended authoritarian rule in Spain and Portugal resulted in a different pattern of a state dominated system, characterized by the exclusion of organized interests and a more uniform “state charity” pattern of welfare (see Santos, 1994; Guibentif, 1997; Rhodes, 1997, p. 9).
Accordingly, the four countries could be grouped into two clusters, one (clientelism dominated) comprised of Italy and Greece and the other (corporatism dominated) comprised of Spain and Portugal. This different political legacy also determines the possibilities of consensus-based neo-corporatist arrangements of welfare reform, which are much more easy to undertake in Spain and Portugal. It is illustrative of the fact that in Portugal, the social partners have agreed on five similar “pacts” since 1987.
7. The most important weakness of Ferrera’s model is its “Italian bias”,
that is a projection of the characteristics of the Italian system to the other
three countries. As we have seen this is clear, for instance, with respect to
the central argument about the “iper garantismo”, the purported “super
generosity” of the pensions systems as an essential peculiarity of the
“Southern Welfare System”.
First of all, one should take into account the fact that in Greece,
Spain and Portugal, the wages are substantially lower than the European average
and often very close to the poverty threshold. Therefore, it is understandable
that lower replacement ratios would not ensure the survival of the recipients.
Actually,
the real situation of the level of pensions is far from being “generous”, for
all countries except Italy. Admittedly, there is an important inequality
between various categories of pensioners in the South, especially in Greece and
Italy. More specifically, public servants maintain important advantages with
regard to the contributions period and the replacement rate in comparison with
the blue-collar workers of the private sector. Still, similar gaps between
“high” and “low” protection constitute a general characteristic of the
continental model. As Esping-Andersen has demonstrated, it is generally in the
“corporatist” welfare states that the allocative (risks vs. needs) and
distributive (protected vs. unprotected) implications of the model have
resulted in a real gap between a clientele of strongly covered “insiders” of
the market on the one side, and growing numbers of underprotected “outsiders”
on the other (Schulte, 1999, p. 212).
II- General characteristics of the Social Protection Systems in
Southern Europe
The
South-European “variant” as a sub-category of the State-corporatist model
One cannot
but agree with Ferrera that the '“conservative-corporatist”
political scenario of continental Europe (is) much more complicated in the
South, significantly altering the strategies of the various actors'
(Ferrera, 1997, p. 30). This is clear
and undeniable. The “Southerners” do represent a distinct group within the family of the Continental
welfare states, a variant of this model.
They are merely underdeveloped species of the Continental model, welfare states “in their infancy”, with their main common characteristics the immaturity and relative inefficiency of the social protection systems (cf. Gough, 1996, p. 13, who also includes Turkey in his “rudimentary assistance regime”) and some comparable social and family structures. Not only are their founding principles undeniably Biscmarkian, but also their current institutional, organizational and economic features bear the “signature” of the continental-state corporatist model. Our thesis is that the undeniable deviations are either the result of the delayed development of the social protection systems and/or the outcome of the aforementioned distortions of the administrative and political system. It is noteworthy that even the authors who support the institutional distinctiveness of these countries, after a while do not refer to it as a model but rather as the outcome of a chronic disease, speaking about the “southern institutional syndrome” (Rhodes, 1997, p. 15). More characteristically, another author (Matsaganis, 1999, p. 22) writes that 'in the social protection systems of Southern Europe there are all the distortions of the “conservative model” but to a higher degree'.
However, as there is some clear evidence of
convergence with the other European state-corporatist states, we will continue
to consider the Southern member states of the EU as a group of countries with
many social, political and administrative affinities. That is we will treat them not as a fourth model in the
Esping-Andersen classification, but rather
as the “discount edition” of the
continental one (Abrahamson, 1992, p.10).
Still, one should refrain from regarding all
Southern EU member states as similar. Not only could they be grouped in two
clusters (Greece and Italy on the one side, Spain and Portugal on the other),
as already mentioned, but even within each cluster, the differences are rather
important, especially between Italy and Greece, countries of unequal
socioeconomic development.
Furthermore, immense regional disparities within each country should also be taken into consideration. Of course the
cleavage between the poor Italian south and the overdeveloped North (Fargion,
1997) offers the most illustrative example of extreme differentiation, but it
is not an isolated case. In Spain there are similar differences, for example
between Autonomous States like the Basque Country, where the right to a minimum
income is a justiciable claim and others, like Aragon or Cantabria where
similar programs are discretionary and rather insufficient with regard to local
social needs (Laparra and Aguilar, 1997). This intra-state territorial
diversity is less evident in Greece and Portugal, because of the centralist,
unitary organization of the political system and the relative weakness of the
regional authorities. However, the inequalities of peripheral development
result, even in these countries, in fragmented social policies, especially in
the poorer regions where lack of adequate infrastructure, know-how and trained
personnel result in huge gaps in social protection. Still, even between areas
of similar economic development, as for instance Oporto and Lisbon,
differentiation exists due to the variance of available resources (Garcia, 1999,
p. 169).
Basic patterns of the
Welfare State in Southern Europe
After
having presented the discussion on the existence of a Southern European model,
it is now time to proceed to the analysis of the general characteristics of the
social protection systems of the countries of the region. Presently, all of
their Constitutions establish the normative principle of the "Social
State" either explicitly[1]
or by means of constitutional provisions guaranteeing a number of social rights
[2].
Actually, social rights were present in the earlier constitutions of the
aftermath of the World War I and more specifically in the Constitutions of
Greece of 1927 (art. 19-24), of Italy (1927), of Portugal of 1933 (art. 12-21) and of Spain (1931, 1938). However, this does
not constitute a particularity of the South, (cf. Ferrera, 1998), as
practically all the countries of the continental model enshrine this principle[3]
or include in their constitutional texts an analytical enumeration of social
rights[4]
(Katrougalos, 1998).
At a
sub-constitutional level, the legal entitlement to services or, more often, to
monetary transfers in cash, is guaranteed by an analytical and meticulous
aggregate of public law regulations. As already mentioned, the welfare
provisions are largely based on the insurance principle, connecting social
benefits to contributions and consequently, to the salary of the workers.
Inevitably, social rights are not universal, but categorical and work focused.
This
institutional commitment sharply contrasts to one of the most striking
characteristics of the social protection system in the Southern European
countries, that is, the delay in the development of the Welfare State. This is
strictly associated with the overall delay of economic development, as there is
a clear correlation between insufficient social expenditure and low GDP
(Eurostat, 1994b; Commission Européenne; 1998, p. 7). All of them (with the exception of the Italian
North and some regions in Spain) have been, till very recently, rather poor
agricultural countries, characterized by late and incomplete industrialization.
The gap between them and the “core” European countries has not been overcome
yet. For instance, in the 1990s, the GDP per head in Greece and in Portugal
still amounted to only 65 per cent of the Union average (Eurostat, 1994b).
The corollary of the belated economic development was the institutional delay of welfare state formation. A compulsory insurance scheme against unemployment was not introduced in Portugal until 1975, whereas in 1974 only the 20 per cent of the population have insurance coverage (Hoffmann, 1983).
The democratization of Greece, Spain and Portugal, the least developed countries of the region, in the 1970’s was concomitant with an effort to build the structures of a genuine welfare state. The rise of the socialist parties in power favored the process. Over the 1980-1992 period, the southern states have had a real growth of social protection expenditure per capita of approximately 70 per cent, whereas the corresponding figure for the six highest spending Member States was only 31.7 per cent and the EU average 40. 6 per cent (Eurostat, 1994b). Still, it is noteworthy that the expansion of the welfare structures, welfare structures, contrary to the situation in other European States which profited from the continuous economic development of the 1960’s, occurred in a period of general economic recession (see figure 1).
Figure
1
Growth of social Expenditure as percentage of GDP-
Growth 1980-1990
Growth 1990-1996
Source: Commission 1993 Source: Eurostat,
Statistics in focus, Population and social conditions, 5/99, Social Protection
in the European Union, Iceland and Norway
In Italy and Greece (but not so much in Spain and Portugal) the bulk of income transfers is absorbed by old age pensions and to a lesser degree, invalidity pensions (see Figure 2). These are in principle, calculated on the basis of the previous salary and the contributions paid. The rates of these contributions differ widely across occupational categories and economic sectors, with private employees generally paying the highest rates.
Spain Portugal
Greece Italy
Source:
Eurostat-ESSPROS 2000.
These patterns are very close to the typical State corporatist model, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure
3 Social Expenditure by
category
Source:
Eurostat-ESSPROS, 2000 ;
However, due to the fragmentation of the social insurance units and the plethora of related schemes, especially in Greece and Italy, there is a considerable divergence of the benefits paid to different categories of the retired population (Venieris, 1994).
The amount of benefits that
households receive in the domain of family allowances or child care is far
below the EU average. The disproportionate distribution of the social benefits
between the elderly and the non-aged population is a salient characteristic of
the state-corporatist model. Whereas the welfare State covers about 50 per cent
of the day care needs of Swedish or Danish children, the coverage is below 5
per cent in Italy (Esping-Andersen, 1994, p.16) and below 3 per cent in Greece.The basic reason for this
underdevelopment of child care is that it remains by and large the family’s
responsibility. These services are traditionally provided by women (full-time
housewives) or “third country” migrant
women who are employed as nannies or domestic servants.
A factor of differentiation, which
partly explains the dissimilar pattern of welfare benefit distribution in the
Iberian countries, especially in Spain, is, since the beginning of the 1980’s,
the departure of their social protection systems from the traditional
orientation of income protection towards a system focusing more on economic
growth and employment support (Rhodes, 1997, p. 38). The new paradigm has
workfare characteristics and is targeting the excluded trough means tests (cf.
Laparra, Aguilar, 1997).
Another common characteristic in most southern European countries, subsequent to the predominance of insurance based benefits, is the very low expenditure on social assistance. This is particularly low in Greece and relatively higher in Italy. The situation remained stable during the last decade, with the exception of Spain, where the number of beneficiaries of means-tested benefits increased ten-fold from 1982 to 1992. In this year social assistance schemes covered 12 per cent of the population, as a response to high unemployment and job instability, which constituted a very important danger for the social cohesion of Spain (Lapara and Aguilar, 1997). Nevertheless, the new social assistance programs are rather extensions of the contributory ones, failing to reach the real outsiders of the market and those excluded from the market, thus reconfirming, the “corporatist” character of the system.
In addition, and contrary to the median Continental “core” countries, until recently the southern welfare systems lacked any kind of universal minimum income support scheme. Portugal was the first to introduce such a scheme (in 1996), while local and regional schemes exist in Italy and Spain. In Greece there is still no income maintenance for non insured young persons, for instance first job-seekers, despite the existence of a very low universal non-contributory public assistance pension for the elderly above 60. The unemployment benefits are also dependent on previous employment, up to a maximum of 70 per cent of the last salary and last for limited time periods. This situation reveals an important gap in the protection of the outsiders of the market. According to estimates of the European Commission (Commission Européenne, 1998, p. 11), in 1993, 25 per cent of the Europeans unemployed for more than three months did not receive any unemployment allowance (although they had access to some kind of non contributory minimum income support system). The respective percentage for Portugal, Greece and Italy was 66 per cent. The lack of the safety-value provided by a nationally based minimum income support system in Greece and Italy makes the situation of long-term unemployed rather precarious.
Regarding the financing of the
social security system, there is an absolute dominance of contribution based
social insurance schemes. Although the idea of an equal distribution of the
expenses between the State, the employers and the employees has been discussed
recently within the framework of a social dialogue prior to the adoption of the
reforms of the insurance legislation in all four countries, the traditional
institutional patterns remained almost intact. Only the National Health Systems
and family allowances are financed by the state. Yet, in practice, the public
purse also covers the deficits of the insurance units.
Accordingly, the pattern of financing is
similar to the average of the state-corporatist model.
III- Recent developments
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